CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Lis PENDENS-NEW JERSEY'S Lis PENDENS STATUTE NOT VIOLATIVE OF DUE PRocEss-Chrysler Corp. v.
Fedders Corp., 670 F.2d 1316 (3d Cir. 1982).
In New Jersey, when real property is the subject of an action that
seeks in some way to affect its title, the plaintiff must file a lis pendens
to impart notice of the forthcoming litigation.' One of the principal
benefits derived from filing lis pendens is that the filing significantly
reduces the likelihood that the defendant will alienate the property
prior to adjudication. 2 The lis pendens procedure has recently undergone close constitutional scrutiny by the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey3 and the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit in Chrysler Corp. v. Fedders Corp.4 The courts
questioned whether the filing of lis pendens was used simply to notify
the world of pending litigation or whether the procedure actually
constituted a taking of property by state action, thus requiring procedural due process under the fourteenth amendment. 5 Furthermore,
the court of appeals examined whether the statutes met these constitutional standards. 6 In reversing the district court's ruling that New
Jersey's lis pendens statute was unconstitutional, the court of appeals
held that although the filing of lis pendens effected a taking of prop7
erty, the statute complied with the requisites of due process.
Chrysler Corporation (Chrysler) and Fedders Corporation (Fed8
ders) executed a contract for the sale of Chrysler's Airtemp division.
The agreement called for a transfer 9 of Airtemp to Fedders in return
for eighteen million dollars in cash, a substantial promissory note, and

I Lis pendens is now codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:15-6 to -17 (West 1948) (amended
1960). See generally infra notes 19-43 and accompanying text.
2 See infra notes 23, 25, 31, 36, 105 & 138 and accompanying text.
3 Chrysler Corp. v. Fedders Corp., 519 F. Supp. 1252 (D.N.J. 1981), rev'd, 670 F.2d 1316
(3d Cir. 1982).
670 F.2d 1316 (3d Cir. 1982).
Id. at 1325-27; 519 F. Supp. at 1261-63.
670 F.2d at 1327-31.
Id. at 1331.
Id. at 1317. The Airtemp Division was engaged in designing, manufacturing, marketing,
and servicing nonautomotive air conditioning systems. Chrysler Corp. v. Fedders Corp., 643
F.2d 1229, 1231 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 388 (1981).
" The transfer was performed as follows: Fedders agreed to purchase the assets of Chrysler's
Airtemp Division. To facilitate the transaction, Fedders created a wholly owned subsidiary, also
called Airtemp, to which the assets were assigned. To provide continuity, Chrysler agreed to
service the new Airtemp for nine months. Fedders received a "bill of sale and assignment" and
received the old Airtemp's trademarks and patents. Chrysler Corp. v. Airtemp Corp., 426 A.2d
845, 847, 852 (Del. Super. Ct. 1980).
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delivery of a class of Fedders's preferred stock.' 0 Fedders also assumed
certain liabilities of Airtemp."I
The controversy began when Fedders examined Airtemp's financial records, 12 leading Fedders to believe that Chrysler overstated
Airtemp's assets and understated its losses. 1 3 When negotiations to
cure the defects failed, Fedders discontinued making payments on the
promissory note and ceased issuing stock dividends. 1 4 Chrysler then
initiated a series of lawsuits alleging generally that Fedders fraudulently conspired not to pay the full consideration for Airtemp's assets.' 5 In the instant case, Chrysler filed suit against Fedders in the
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey on March
4, 1981, alleging that Airtemp's assets were liquidated by Fedders and
then used to pay liens and mortgages on property Fedders owned in
Edison, New Jersey. 1 The complaint further alleged securities
violations. 17 As a remedy, Chrysler sought eighty-five million dollars

10670 F.2d at 1317. The note allegedly required prepayment of the principal in 1984 and
1985, but an accelerated prepayment clause provided for a total prepayment if Fedders sold "any
of its operating divisions or subsidiaries for cash in excess of $10 million." Chrysler, 519 F. Supp.
at 1258.
1 670 F.2d at 1317. Airtemp was valued at $93,000,000. The total amount paid by Fedders
was $57,500,000. The difference was due to the fact that Airtemp annually lost $10,000,000.
Brief for Respondent at 2, Chrysler Corp. v. Fedders Corp., 670 F.2d 1316 (3d Cir. 1982)
[hereinafter cited as Brief for Respondent].
12 See Brief for Respondent, supra note 11, at 2.
11 670 F.2d at 1317. The net deficiency was allegedly in excess of $28,000,000. Brief for
Respondent, supra note 11, at 2.
11670 F.2d at 1317.
15 Id. Chrysler in fact initiated several lawsuits, this being the last. See, e.g., Chrysler Corp.
v. Fedders Corp., 643 F.2d 1229 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 388 (1981) (charging
Fedders with antitrust violations); Chrysler Corp. v. Airtemp Corp., 426 A.2d 845 (Del. Super.
Ct. 1980) (action for recovery of services performed by Chrysler for Airtemp); Chrysler Corp. v.
Fedders Corp., 51 N.Y.2d 953, 416 N.E.2d 1036, 435 N.Y.S.2d 700 (1980) (New York Court of
Appeals held Fedders must pay dividends on stock); Chrysler Corp. v. Fedders Corp., 76 A.D.2d
799, 429 N.Y.S.2d 340 (App. Div. 1980). Two other suits are still pending in the United States
District Courts for the Eastern District of Michigan and Southern District of New York. Brief for
Respondent, supra note 11, at 2.
16 519 F. Supp. at 1253. Jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship.
Specifically,
Fedders is a Spanish corporation with New Jersey property, while Chrysler is a Michigan
corporation. Chrysler Corp. v. Fedders Corp., 643 F.2d 1229, 1229 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 102
S. Ct. 388 (1981). The New Jersey federal district court pointed out that the alleged fraud was
the result of a restructured deal involving the sale of Fedders' Norge Division. 519 F. Supp. at
1258. Chrysler alleged that the prepayment provision of the promissory note was avoided when
the Norge sale was restructured. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
mistakenly assumed Fedders used Airtemp's assets to discharge the liens. See 670 F.2d at 1317.
The contract provision did not specify from where the $10,000,000 came. 519 F. Supp. at 1258.
17 670 F.2d at 1317; see 15 U.S.C. § 78 (j)(b)(1976) (use of interstate commerce, mails, or
facility of National Securities Exchange to deceive in connection with sale of any security is
unlawful).
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in compensatory damages and punitive damages, demanding that
either an equitable lien or constructive trust be imposed on the prop-erty. 18
Chrysler then filed a notice of lis pendens pursuant to New
Jersey's lis pendens statute, which requires a plaintiff to file a public
notice of litigation whenever real estate in New Jersey is the subject of
a suit to enforce or affect a lien or encumbrance thereon or to affect
the title to that property.' 9 Before answering the complaint, Fedders
moved to discharge the lis pendens on constitutional grounds and by
dismissal, transfer, or stay of the action. 20 The district court denied all
motions except the constitutional challenge and ordered a discharge of
the lis pendens. 2' The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit stayed
22
the district court's order and granted an expedited appeal.
In order to understand the constitutional issue of first impression
in New Jersey addressed by the Chrysler courts one must examine the
development of lis pendens. Before the advent of lis pendens, courts
occasionally rendered unenforceable judgments in suits involving real
property. 23 Property that was the subject of a lawsuit could be conveyed prior to judgment by the defendant to a bona fide purchaser,
against whom the victorious plaintiff would have no satisfactory recourse. 24 His only alternative would be to prove in a subsequent action
25
that the purchaser was not bona fide.
'8 670 F.2d at 1317. Constructive trusts are generally used to remedy a breach of an express
trust. However, when property is allegedly held or acquired wrongfully, courts may impose a
constructive trust thereby compelling the surrender of that property to the plaintiff. Courts ma-'
also give the plaintiff a security interest by imposing an equitable lien. See D'Ippolito v. Castro,
51 N.J. 584, 242 A.2d 617 (1968); A. ScoTT, ABRIDGEMENT OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS 770 (1960).
'1 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-6 to -17 (West 1948) (amended 1960).
50 Fedders nonconstitutional arguments were, first, the partial summary judgment achieved
by Chrysler in the New York action was res judicata to this suit. 519 F.Supp. at 1254. Second,
Chrysler was attempting to rescind an already affirmed contract. Id. Third, the action should be
dismissed pending the outcome of litigation presently in the Southern District of New York. Id.
Fourth, venue should be changed to the Southern District of New York. Id. Fifth, the action
should be stayed pending the New York litigation. Id. Interestingly, the district court stated that
while dismissal of the lawsuit would discharge the lis pendens, a stay or change of venue would
not. Id. at 1255.
21 Id. at 1254.
22 670 F.2d at 1319.
23 See generally J. POMEROy, TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 633, at 1216-20 (1905)
(parties could prejudice one another by conveying property); Note, Abuses of the CaliforniaLis
Pendens: An Appeal for Legislative Remedy, 39 S. CAL. L. REV. 108 (1966).
21 Turner v. Houpt, 53 N.J. Eq. 526, 33 A. 28 (Ch. 1895), revd, 55 N.J. Eq. 593, 39 A. 1114
(1897) (preadjudicatory alienation of property creates subsequent litigation): see Gray v. Case,
51 N.J. Eq. 426, 26 A. 805 (Ch. 1893) (policy of courts is prevention of needless litigation).
25 A legitimate bona fide purchaser in good faith, for valuable consideration, and without
notice, could defeat a rightful but subsequent purchaser. Eastwood v. Shedd, 166 Colo. 136, 442
P.2d 423 (1968); see also Strong v. Whybark, 204 Mo. 341, 102 S.W. 968 (1907) (examples of
nonbona fide purchasers).
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In response to the injustice resulting from the application of this
rule, the judiciary created lis pendens.2 8 Under this doctrine, the mere
filing of a lawsuit served as constructive notice to all that the property
was the subject of litigation. 27 Therefore, lis pendens eliminated the
status of a bona fide purchaser since all buyers took the property
subject to the outcome of the litigation. As a result, courts' judgments
2
were fully enforceable.
The application of lis pendens at common law was still fraught
with problems. Since the litigation concerning the property was not
clearly recorded, diligent searches rarely revealed the encumbrance. 29
Moreover, as society became increasingly urbanized and its members
more isolated from one another, the filing of a lawsuit failed to notify
many prospective purchasers. 30 Thus, common-law lis pendens facilitated fraudulent transfers of property to good faith purchasers unaware of the pending litigation. To ameliorate these difficulties, many
3
state legislatures enacted lis pendens statutes. '
In 1868, the New Jersey Legislature passed the predecessor to the
current lis pendens statute, which underwent many revisions until
reaching its present form in 1960.32 The current statute requires the
26 Three theories have been advanced as to the origin of lis
pendens: One theory is "that it is
derived from Roman law." Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Knox, 220 N.C. 72, 18 S.E.2d
436 (1942). Another theory is that it was promulgated by Sir Francis Bacon as Lord Keeper of the
Great Seal in 1618, as the 12th of his ordinances in chancery. " 'No decree bindeth any that
cometh in bona fide, by conveyance from the defendant before the bill exhibited, and is made no
party .. .but where he comes in pendente lite . . .there regularly decree bindeth.' " Mabee v.
Mabee, 85 N.J. Eq. 353, 357, 96 A. 495, 497 (Ch. 1916) (quoting id.). Others maintain that it is
a part of ancient law. Bristow v. Thackston, 187 Mo. 332, 86 S.W. 94 (1905); Haughwout v.
Murphy, 22 N.J. Eq. 531 (1871).
27 It was not entirely clear during the period when lis
pendens was developed whether a final
judgment without the lispendens would serve as constructive notice. Compare Haughwout v.
Murphy, 22 N.J. Eq. 531 (1871) and Turner v. Houpt, 53 N.J. Eq. 526, 33 A. 28 (Ch. 1895),
rev'd, 55 N.J. Eq. 593, 39 A. 1114 (1897) with New Jersey Chancery Practice Act of 1868, ch.
494, 1868 N.J. Laws 114.
"I See Haughwout v. Murphy, 22 N.J. Eq. 531, 544 (1871) ("[I1t is necessary to the administration of justice that the decision of the court in a suit should be binding" on all with interests in
property).
29 3 J. CASNER, AMERCAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 1312 (1952). See generally Note, Does
California'sStatutory Lis Pendens Violate ProceduralDue Process?6 PAC. L. J. 62 (1975).
30 See infra note 39 and accompanying text; see also Wood v. Price, 79 N.J. Eq. 620, 81 A.
983 (1911).
1' 3 J. CASNER, supra note 29, § 1312; cf. Palisade Gardens, Inc. v. Grosch, 120 N.J. Eq. 294,
185 A. 27 (Ch. 1936) (plaintiff's conveyance of fraudulently received property set aside since no
lis
pendens filed). See generally Feld v. Kantrowitz, 99 N.J. Eq. 847, 132 A. 657 (1926) (because
lis
pendens was statutory provision, only compliance with statute could protect plaintiff from
bona fide purchaser).
" New Jersey Chancery Practice Act of 1868, ch. 494, 1868 N.J. Laws 114. In 1930, the
legislature eliminated the filing of lispendens for mechanic's liens. Furthermore, a plaintiff
could not file lis
pendens if his cause of action was solely for monetary damages. Act of Apr. 3,
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119

complainant to file a written notice of the pendency of the action in
the county where the property is situated whenever the object of the
suit is "to enforce a lien, other than a mechanic's lien upon real estate
' 33
or to affect the title to real estate or a lien or encumbrance thereon.
Importantly, any person claiming an interest in property taken
through any defendant is bound by the outcome of the litigation. 34 In
contrast, under the common-law approach, the plaintiff by filing the
lawsuit gave constructive notice of the litigation.3 5 Under the statute,
however, this notice could be afforded only by filing a notice of lis
pendens. 36 Additionally, the statute expanded the scope of constructive notice by completely eliminating the bona fide purchaser. Under
the old rule, a bona fide purchaser could defeat the plaintiff's claim to
the property; whereas the statute, adopting the common-law ap37
proach provides the bona fide purchaser no such protection.
Accordingly, the modern concept of lis pendens provides notice
of pending suits and permits the court to maintain jurisdiction and
power over the subject property.3 8 New Jersey courts, however, have
3
construed lis pendens more expansively .

1929, ch. 119, 1930 N.J. Laws 374; see General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Winnebago, Inc., 149 N.J.
Super. 81, 373 A.2d 402 (App. Div. 1977); Garfield v. Elmwood Stores, Inc., 17 N.J. Super. 513,
86 A.2d 308 (Ch. Div. 1952); infra note 34 and accompanying text.
33 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-6 (West 1948) (amended 1960). Lis pendens is filed after the
complaint and it must identify the action and describe the affected real estate. Id. It must be
filed in the office of the county clerk in the county where the land lays. Id. The clerk must index
the filing and keep it updated. Id. § 2A:15-12. In practice, the lis pendens is filed with the
complaint. Harvey v. Randall, 98 N.J. Eq. 104, 130 A. 470 (Ch. 1926); see Schwartz v.
Grunwald, 174 N.J. Super. 164, 415 A.2d 1203 (Ch. Div. 1980) (lis pendens filed before
counterclaim became ineffective). See generally Walker v. Hill's Ex'rs, 22 N.J. Eq. 513 (1871).
34 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-7 (West 1948) (amended 1960). The person "shall be deemed to
have acquired the same with knowledge of the pendency of the action, and shall be bound by
any judgment entered therein as though he had been made a party thereto." Id.; cJ. Palisade
Gardens, Inc. v. Grosch, 120 N.J. Eq. 294, 185 A. 22 (Ch. 1936).
Is See supra note 22.
316N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-8 (West 1948) (amended 1960) provides:
Unless and until a notice of lis pendens is filed as herein provided, no action, as to
which such notice is required shall before final judgment entered therein, be taken to
be constructive notice to a bona fide purchaser, or mortgager of, or a person
acquiring a lien on the affected real estate.
Id.; see Wood v. Price, 79 N.J. Eq. 620, 622, 81 A. 983, 984 (1911); Wendy's, Inc. v. Blanchard
Management Corp., 170 N.J. Super. 491, 406 A.2d 1337 (Ch. Div. 1979).
37 Wendy's, Inc. v. Blanchard Management Corp., 170 N.J. Super. 491, 406 A.2d 1337 (Ch.
Div. 1979).
31 Wood v. Price, 79 N.J. Eq. 620, 623, 81 A. 983, 984-85 (1911); Turner v. Houpt, 53 N.J.
Eq. 526, 555, 33 A. 28, 45 (Ch. 1895), rev'd, 55 N.J. Eq. 593, 39 A. 1114 (1897). See generally 3
J. CASNE, supra note 29, § 13.12.
3' Cf. Jonnet v. Dollar Sav. Bank, 530 F.2d 1128, 1132 (3d Cir. 1976) (Gibbons, J.,
concurring). The modern statute lends itself to a more expansive interpretation than the earlier

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13:115

In General Electric Credit Corp. v. Winnebago, Inc. ,40 the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey recognized that
lis pendens was applicable when a plaintiff sought to obtain title to or
impose a new lien or restriction on real estate. 4' Furthermore, in a
42
case similar to Chrysler, the appellate division, in Polk v. Schwartz,
held that since the plaintiffs had alleged that the defendants acquired
real estate with assets fraudulently procured from plaintiffs and
sought the imposition of a constructive trust on the property, Iis
43
pendens was appropriate.
This trend toward an expansive interpretation of lis pendens was
capsulized by the chancery division in United Savings & Loan Association v. Scruggs. 44 In Scruggs, the dispute focused on a mortgage
foreclosure. In dicta, however, the court examined the General Electric holding, finding two distinct consequences resulting from the
filing of lis pendens. First, when the plaintiff had an "existing lien or
interest of record," lis pendens served as notice informing the world of
pending litigation. 45 Second, in accordance with General Electric, the
court stated that lis pendens had taken on a substantive aspect. This
substantive aspect resulted because a plaintiff who asserted a new lien
or interest and properly filed a notice of lis pendens, obtained an
interest in the property superior to those who subsequently obtained
46
an interest in the property.
Despite the longevity of the lis pendens rule, its constitutionality
had not been questioned until the statute was expansively interpreted. 47 The first constitutional scrutiny in New Jersey came in Chrysones. The 1880 statute, for example, affected only possession of or title to land, Act of Feb. 16,
1880, ch. 19, 1880 N.J. Laws 3175, while the 1929 statute additionally included actions concerning an encumbrance or lien on the real property. Act of Apr. 3, 1929, ch. 119, 1930 N.J. Laws
374.
40 149 N.J. Super. 81, 373 A.2d 402 (App. Div. 1977).
41 Id. at 84-85, 373 A.2d at 404. In General Electric, the appellate division was faced with
an action seeking specific performance of the defendant's promise to execute a mortgage. The
court reversed the trial court's cancellation of the lis pendens, and held that the filing of lis
pendens is permitted in two distinct situations: "where the object of the action is either to affect
or enforce an existing lien upon real estate or to affect title to real estate." Id.; see also Debral
Realty, Inc. v. DiChiara, -Mass.-, 420 N.E.2d 343 (1981) (holding lis pendens statute constitutional but not deciding whether lis pendens was properly used).
42 166 N.J. Super. 292, 399 A.2d 1001 (App. Div. 1979).
41 Id. at 298, 399 A.2d at 1004. Polk held that an action to impose a constructive trust will
have an effect on title to real estate. Id.; see supra note 18.
44 181 N.J. Super. 52, 436 A.2d 559 (Ch. Div. 1981).
45 Id. at 56, 436 A.2d at 561.
46 Id. at 58-59, 436 A.2d at 562.
41 See Batey v. Digirolamo, 418 F. Supp. 695 (D. Hawaii 1976); Lake Tulloch v. Dingman,
No. WE C-27140 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 1, 1973); Kukanskis v. Griffith, 180 Conn. 501, 430 A.2d
21 (1980); Debral Realty, Inc. v. DiChiara, -Mass.-, 420 N.E.2d 343 (1981); George v.
Oakhurst Realty, Inc., 78 R.I. 212, 414 A.2d 471 (1980).
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ler, when the United States District Court for the District of New
Jersey held that the New Jersey lis pendens statute was unconstitutional. 48 To reach this conclusion, the court initially found that the
49
filing of the lis pendens with the court clerk constituted state action,
thus triggering fourteenth amendment protections. Because the filing
of lis pendens was an attempt to create a new interest in Fedder's
property, the market value of the real estate decreased, thereby impairing the owner's ability to alienate it. 50 The district court con51
cluded that this impairment resulted in a deprivation of property.
The court then found that the deprivation triggered the balancing test
delineated by the United States Supreme Court in Mathews v.
Eldridge.52 The factors which the district court balanced were: the
and the governprivate interests, the risks of erroneous deprivation,
53
ment's interests in efficient administration.
The district court found that the impact on the defendant's ability to alienate its property could result in substanti'al economic losses
to the private party. Furthermore, it decided that there was a great
risk that these losses would arise from an erroneous deprivation of the
right to alienate because the statute required only that the plaintiff file
54
a written notice of its action without evidence to support the claim.
Finally, the court noted that the government could readily provide a
cost-effective procedure which would satisfy the due process hearing
requirements, while accommodating both the state and individual
interests.5 5 Finding that the New Jersey statute neither provided for a
post or prefiling hearing nor accommodated the defendant's interest,

4 519 F. Supp. at 1264.
Id. at 1260; see infra notes 75-95 and accompanying text. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 18-1 to 18-7, at 1147-1174 (1978).
o 519 F. Supp. at 1260.
s*Id. The court also maintained that property rights are not created by the Constitution.
Instead they "stem from an independent source such as state law." Board of Regents of State
Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1971).
52 424 U.S. 319 (1976).The Mathews test requires a court to balance:
First, the private interests[s] that will be affected by the official action; second, the
risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and
the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and
finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail.
" 519 F. Supp. at 1262 (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335).
u Id.
"' Id. at 1264. See generally Note, Lis Pendens and ProceduralDue Process, 1 PEPPERDINE L.
REv. 433 (1974).
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the court declared that the application of the statute in this case
violated due orocess and therefore was unconstitutional.5"
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed. Judge Sloviter, writing for the court, initially declared that a
reversal of the district court's decision was mandated if Chrysler
prevailed on any one of three arguments. Chrysler argued, first, since
lis pendens provided only notice of the litigation, there was no deprivation of property. Second, it was settled law that neither the existence of a statute authorizing the filing nor the acts of the participating clerk is state action. Finally, the lis pendens statute offered the
57
procedures and protections necessary to satisfy due process.
Noting that lis pendens was unarguably applicable, Judge Sloviter first addressed whether the filing deprived Fedders of a property
interest. 58 The court analogized the deprivation resulting from lis
pendens to that suffered by debtors in creditor attachment cases. 59
The appellate court distinguished these cases by finding that the
debtor is totally precluded from "possession, use and enjoyment of
property," 60 once attached, while the lis pendens procedure prevented only the alienation of property and allowed the owner to use
and enjoy it.61 The appellate court acknowledged, however, the detri62
mental effect lis pendens had on the marketability of the property.
In its analysis of the deprivation issue, Judge Sloviter relied on
the United States Supreme Court's prejudgment creditor attachment
cases, which held that even when the taking is less than complete,
procedural due process is necessary. In Fuentes v. Shevin,6 3 the major-

56 519 F. Supp. at 1263; cf. Cal. Civ. Code § 409.1 (West 1968) (amended 1980) (upon
motion supported by affidavit, party may expunge lis pendens within 20 days of filing).
11 670 F.2d at 1319. Chrysler claimed lis pendens does not affect the owner's use, possession,
or enjoyment of the property. Chrysler also maintained that Fedders had no constitutional right
to alienate property to a bona fide purchaser. Id.
56 Id. at 1321. The parties agreed that the holding in Polk that a suit seeking to impose a
constructive trust is an action in which the notice of lis pendens is proper controlled here. Id.
56 Id. at 1321. The creditor attachment cases are: North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. DiChem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975) (invalidating Georgia procedure of garnishment without prior
hearing); Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 415 U.S. 600 (1974) (holding sequestration statute
constitutional, as it accommodates the interests of all parties); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67
(1972) (holding replevin statutes without prior hearing unconstitutional); Sniadach v. Family
Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 1337 (1969) (holding prejudgment garnishment of wages without notice or
prior hearing unconstitutional).
60 670 F.2d at 1321-22.

61

Id.

Id. at 1322. In an affidavit, a title expert stated that title insurance will not be issued once
lis pendens is filed. Brief for Respondent, supra note 11, at 17. For a general analysis of the
taking issue, see Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
63 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
12
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ity, faced with the constitutionality of a replevin statute, stated that
"[a]ny significant taking of property" was within the ambit of procedural due process.1 4 In Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,65 Justice
Harlan, in a concurrence, stated that those suffering "deprivation[s
that] cannot be characterized as de minimus, must be accorded the
usual requisite of due process."" Moreover, the appellate court acknowledged a series of cases holding that nonpossessory prejudgment
real estate attachment situations amounted to a significant deprivation of property requiring fourteenth amendment protection. 7 The
Chrysler court, however, did not view these cases as controlling.
Rather, in upholding the lis pendens statute, the court of appeals
emphasized Spielman-Fond, Inc. v. Hanson's, Inc. ,68 in which a three
judge federal district court upheld the constitutionality of Arizona's
mechanic's lien statute.6 9 The district court found that although a
mechanic's lien encumbers the owner's property, the right to alienate
has not been foreclosed and therefore is not a taking that requires due
process.7 0 Judge Sloviter compared the effect of a mechanic's lien with
the effect of lis pendens. She noted that in both procedures, even
though the owners were deprived of the ability to alienate the property, they remained in possession and enjoyed use of the property.
Accordingly, the deprivation was not as great as the deprivation in
7
creditor attachment cases. 1
Although acknowledging a series of district court cases upholding
Spielman-Fond,72 the Chrysler court was reluctant to apply it beyond
its precise facts for two reasons: the significant distinction between a
mechanic's lien and a lis pendens 73 and the summary affirmation of
o Id. at 86.
65 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
66 Id. at 342 (Harlan, J., concurring).
17 670 F.2d at 1322; see, e.g., Terranova v. Avco Fin. Servs., Inc., 396 F. Supp. 1402 (D. Vt.
1975); Bay State Harness Racing & Breeding Ass'n v. PPG Indus., 365 F. Supp. 1299 (D. Mass.
1973); Clement v. Four N. State St. Corp., 360 F. Supp. 933 (D.N.H. 1973). But see Northwest
Homes, Inc. v. Weyhaeuser Co., 526 F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 907 (1976)
(no deprivation); In re The Oronoka, 393 F. Supp. 1311 (D. Me. 1975) (taking insignificant).
56 379 F. Supp. 997 (D. Ariz. 1973), aJf'd summarily. 417 U.S. 901 (1974).
66 Id. at 999-1000.
70 Id. at 999. The district court stated that a willing buyer could be found, albeit with
difficulty. Id.
11 670 F.2d at 1322-23.
72 See, e.g., B.P. Dev. v. Walker, 420 F. Supp. 704 (W.D. Pa. 1976) (Pennsylvania's
mechanic's lien statute constitutional); In re Thomas A. Cary, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 667 (E.D. Va.
1976), afJ'd without opinion, 562 F.2d 48 (4th Cir. 1977) (Virginia's mechanic's lien statute not
violative of fourteenth amendment). But see Barry Properties, Inc. v. Fick Bros. Roofing Co.,
277 Md. 15, 353 A.2d 222 (1976) (Maryland's mechanic's lien statute unconstitutional).
73 670 F.2d at 1324. Mechanic's liens unlike /is
pendens may be viewed as liens imposed with
the debtor's consent since the property has been enhanced by labor and materials for which
payment is required. Id.
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Spielman-Fond by the Supreme Court of the United States without
opinion. 74 The court of appeals reached no definitive opinion on
whether the filing of the notice of lis pendens was a "taking." Instead,
Judge Sloviter decided only that the procedure caused a deprivation of
75
property sufficient to activate the due process clause.
The court then addressed whether the filing of lis pendens represented state action. In Flagg Brothers Inc. v. Brooks, 76 the Supreme
Court decided that the New York Commercial Code's 77 authorization
of a sale of goods entrusted to a warehouseman for storage was not
state action. 78 The court of appeals, however, found Chrysler's reliance on Flagg Brothers misplaced. 79 Instead of the position Chrysler
advocated, in part that disputes between debtors and creditors were
traditionally private functions,8 0 the court focused on the level of
"overt official involvement, '"s to determine if state action was
present. Because the procedure in FlaggBrothers contained no level of
official involvement, in contradistinction to the filing of lis pendens,
state action was not present . 2 The court of appeals next examined
creditor attachment cases, in which the state took a more active role.8 3
This more active state involvement was exemplified by Fuentes v.
Shevin. In Fuentes the court issued a writ of replevin, and a sheriff
seized the property and stored it for three days.8 4 The Court noted
that official involvement in the replevin procedure was clearly shown
unlike the lis pendens procedure in which the official involvement of
85
the state was slight.

4 Id. Although summary affirmance on the merits is binding, the precedential value is
limited to the exact facts of the case. Id. at 1323.
" Id. at 1324-25.
7 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
77 N.Y. COM. LAW § 7-210 (McKinney 1963).
71 436 U.S. at 152-53. For a general discussion of state action, see L. TmBE, supra note 49,
§ 18-1, at 1147-49.
71 670 F.2d at 1325-26.
80 436 U.S. at 160. Chrysler also argued that the field of commercial transactions is an
inappropriate area for the expansion of state action. 670 F.2d at 1325.
81 670 F.2d at 1325 (citing Flagg Brothers, 436 U.S. at 157).
82 Id. at 1325-26. The court of appeals, on grounds similar to those used to distinguish Flagg

Brothers, also rejected Chrysler's reliance on Parks v. "Mr. Ford", 556 F.2d 132 (3d Cir. 1977),
which held that a common-law garageman's possessing lien did not invoke state action. 670 F.2d
at 1326-27.
83 670 F.2d at 1326.
84 407 U.S. at 71.
85 670 F.2d at 1326. Lis pendens gives the clerk a small part in the procedure. The statute,
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-6 (West 1948) (amended 1960), requires that the clerk receive the filing
of the lis pendens with the complaint describing the real estate and the objective of the suit,
Another provision directs the clerk to discharge the lis pendens when the court finds that the
plaintiff is not prosecuting diligently. Id, § 2A:15-10. The clerk must maintain a record book of
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The court then turned to Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., and
North Georgia Finishingv. Di-Chem, Inc. ,8 both garnishment cases,
in which clerks issued summonses of garnishment based solely on the
plaintiffs' complaint or affidavit. 87 The circuit court noted that these
acts, even if considered ministerial, may constitute state action and
cannot be distinguished from the acts of the clerk in a lis pendens
situation. 8 Although the court noted that the lis pendens procedure
was indistinguishable from acts that may constitute state action, it
was unable to reach a definite conclusion on whether the filing of lis
pendens invoked state action. 89 Thus, the court relied on analagous
Supreme Court decisions"0 to hold that a filing of lis pendens did
activate state action.9 ' Nevertheless, the court was "uncomfortable"
in its conclusion that a seemingly ministerial function by a court clerk
92
constituted state action.
Having concluded that the filing of lis pendens met a minimal
threshold requisite of a taking and state action, the court scrutinized
the lis pendens procedure to determine if it violated the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. 93 The court of appeals applied
94
the Mathews balancing test to ascertain if due process was satisfied.
Accordingly, the circuit court first weighed the competing private and
public interests at stake. 95 Judge Sloviter commenced her private interest analysis by focusing upon the defendant property owner's intended use of the real estate.9 8 The court acknowledged that the filing
of lis pendens would not have a detrimental impact on a defendant
who had no intention of selling the property, since lis pendens only

the lis pendens filed. Id. § 2A:15-12. Other provisions require the clerk to discharge the 1is
pendens by a variety of court ordered procedures. See id. §§ 2A:15-14, -15, -16, -17.
86 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
81 In Sniadach, the clerk issued the summons upon request by the plaintiff's attorney. 395
U.S. at 338. In North Georgia Finishing, the clerk issued the plaintiff a summons of garnishment
upon presentation of the complaint. 419 U.S. at 604.
18 670 F.2d at 1326-27. In Flagg Brothers, the Supreme Court noted that the issuance of the
summons or writ could be considered state action because the plaintiff had invoked the authority
of the court. Though a ministerial writ, it was because of this writ that the defendant was
deprived of property. 436 U.S. at 149, 161 n.10; see also supra note 85 and accompanying text.
11 See 670 F.2d at 1327.
10 See supra notes 76-88 and accompanying text.
91 Id. at 1327 & n.7.
" Id. at 1327; see supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
91 670 F.2d at 1327; see, e.g., Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1971) (due process is flexible
and is used according to needs of particular circumstances).
" 670 F.2d at 1328.
95 Id.
96 Id.
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lessened its marketability.9 7 In contrast, however, a defendant who
wanted to sell his property could be prevented from so doing because
the filing of lis pendens effectively lowers the market price. 98 Thus,
the court of appeals concluded that the deprivation to defendant
property owners caused by lis pendens was less than total. 99
In contrast, the plaintiff enjoyed a benefit from the filing of a Iis
pendens notice, for it "ensur[ed] that plaintiff's claim is not defeated
by a prejudgment transfer of the property." 100 The court of appeals in
its examination of the third prong of the Mathews test acknowledged
that there were two public interests protected by lis pendens.' 0 First,
lis pendens bolstered the governmental concern in the integrity of the
court system since pendente lite transfers of property which undermine litigants' rights are effectively curtailed. 102 Second, by allowing
those desiring to purchase property to discover and verify that specific
real estate is not the object of litigation, a general public interest is
0 3

served. 1

Having weighed the competing public and private interests affected by lis pendens, the court of appeals next examined "the risk of
erroneous deprivation,"' 0 4 and the value and burdens of additional
safeguards. To apply this test, the court turned to a Supreme Court
debtor-creditor case,10 5 Mitchell v W. T. Grant Co., which held that
lack of a prefiling hearing does not necessarily render a statute uncon-

11Id. The court of appeals did not acknowledge the effect the lis pendens specifically had on
Fedders' property. Id.
08 Id. As the district court noted, the amount of the encumbrance in the present case is over
$10,000,000. 519 F. Supp. at 1258.
19 670 F.2d at 1328. For cases in which courts found a total deprivation of property, see
North Georgia Finishing, 419 U.S. at 601 (freeze of corporation's bank account); Fuentes, 407
U.S. at 67 (loss of household goods); Finberg v. Sullivan, 634 F.2d 50 (3d Cir. 1980) (deprivation
of money for living expenses).
100670 F.2d at 1328-29. If the property is unique and the plaintiff demands specific performance, lis pendens is important because it prevents a transfer of the land and hence protects the
only remedy available to the plaintiff. Id.
10IId. at 1329. For a general discussion of the policy of lis pendens, see Comment, Appeals
and Reversals: A Vast Wasteland, 49 NOTRE DAME LAW. 844, 851 (1973).
102 670 F.2d at 1329. The court of appeals noted that lis pendens is merely one method to
protect the integrity of land transactions. Id. Another method is to require an affidavit of title to
be filed by sellers of property. Id.; see H. AcrKznsoN & E. FULOP, 21 NEW JERSEY PACTICE: SKILLS
AND METHODS § 2068, at 80 (2d ed. 1973).
"103
670 F.2d at 1329; see Wendy's, Inc. v. Blanchard Management Corp., 170 N.J. Super.
491, 406 A.2d 1337 (Ch. Div. 1979).
104 670 F.2d at 1329 (quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335).
oI Id. at 1328. In Finberg v. Sullivan, 634 F.2d 50 (3d Cir. 1980), the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals capsulized these decisions as holding that protection must be afforded the debtor to
avoid erroneous deprivations or arbitrary seizures, although not necessarily by notice and
opportunity to be heard prior to attachment. See id. at 58.
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stitutional.' 06 Instead, under a balancing test, procedural due process
is satisfied if the interests of the creditor and debtor are fairly accom1 07
modated.
Because the lis pendens statute incorporated no prefiling hearing,
Judge Sloviter examined the statute to determine if there was a fair
accommodation of debtor and creditor interests.' 0 8 The statute by its
own terms was available only to a plaintiff who brought an action
affecting the real property's title. 09 Furthermore, the court of appeals
pointed out that the statute allowed a defendant to relieve the property of the notice of lis pendens by posting sufficient security with the
court."10 The court also noted that another section of the statute
provided that a court may directly remove the notice of lis pendens if
the plaintiff failed to prosecute the action diligently."'
In addition to examining the statute, the court of appeals also
maintained that three nonstatutory protections further accommodated a defendant's interest. First, in Wendy's, Inc. v. Blanchard
Management Corp. ,112 Judge Sloviter noted that it was stated in dicta
that the victim of the filing of a wrongful lis pendens may have a cause
of action for malicious prosecution."13 Second, Judge Sloviter noted
that a defendant may, prior to trial, make either a motion to discharge the lis pendens, or third, make a motion for summary judgment or dismissal for failure to state a claim.1 4 The motion to discharge lis pendens should be granted only in the absence of a
"necessary relationship" between the real estate and the plaintiff's
cause of action.1 5 In contrast, the court stated that the summary
6
judgment and dismissal motions went to the merits of the claim.1
416 U.S. 600, 605 (1974).
Id. at 607.
101
670 F.2d at 1329.
106
107

109Id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-6 (West 1948) (amended 1960)).
"I Id. The court noted that Fedders was required to file a bond in the sum of $11,900,000 to
erase a lis pendens filed in Kentucky. Id. at 1330.
"I Id. at 1320-21; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-10 (West 1948) (amended 1960); see Boice v.
Conover, 59 N.J. Eq. 580, 61 A. 159 (Ch. 1905), alf'd, 71 N.J. Eq. 269, 65 A. 191 (1906); see also
Grabowski v. S. & E. Constr. Co., 72 N.J. Super. 1, 177 A.2d 576 (Ch. Div. 1962) (property
against which lis pendens is filed must be subject of suit).
"1 170 N.J. Super. 491, 406 A.2d 1337 (Ch. Div. 1979).
670 F.2d at 1330 (construing Wendy's, 170 N.J. Super. at 498, 406 A.2d at 1340); see also
Albertson v. Raboff, 46 Cal. 2d 375, 295 P.2d 405 (1956) (malicious prosecution cause of action
lies for wrongful suit against property). The court of appeals also noted a possible suit for abuse
of process. 670 F.2d at 1330.
"1 670 F.2d at 1330. In both O'Boyle v. Fairway Prod., Inc., 169 N.J. Super. 165, 167, 404
A.2d 365, 366 (App. Div. 1979) (per curiam), and Polk v. Schwartz, 166 N.J. Super. 292, 299300, 399 A.2d 1001, 1005 (App. Div. 1979), the New Jersey courts likened a motion of summary
judgment (or failure to state a claim) to a motion to discharge a notice of lis pendens.
"1 670 F.2d at 1330.
116 Id.

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13:115

Although conceding that a plaintiff can easily overcome the low
thresholds of motions for summary judgment and dismissal, Judge
Sloviter rejected a contention by Fedders that a postfiling hearing
would render needed assistance to a defendant whose property had
been saddled with a lis pendens notice. The court reasoned that the
deficiencies of the summary judgment and dismissal motions would
7
also be attendant in such a new proceeding."
After employing the Mathews balancing test the court of appeals
vacated the district court's holding and remanded, concluding that
New Jersey's lis pendens statute was fundamentally fair and thus
constitutional."18
In a concurring opinion, Judge Hunter agreed with the court's
holding and acknowledged that lis pendens comported with the due
process guarantees of the fourteenth amendment."" He disagreed,
however, with the court's holding on the taking and state action
issues. Concluding that state action during the lis pendens procedure
is nonexistent, he found that the purely ministerial function of the
20
clerk does not transform the filing of lis pendens into state action.
Judge Hunter further stated that the filing of lis pendens did not
deprive the defendant of a constitutionally protected right because the
defendant maintained use, possession, enjoyment, and alienability of
the property throughout the litigation process. 12 Judge Adams also
agreed that the statute was constitutional. In a concurring opinion, he
contended, however, that the clearest reason for reversal was based on
22
due process grounds. 1
The court of appeals concentrated on the procedural due process
concerns in upholding the constitutionality of the lis pendens statute.
In so doing, it failed to reach a conclusive determination of the taking
and state action issues,1 23 thereby facilitating achievement of a consenId; see also 519 F. Supp. at 1263.
"1 670 F.2d at 1331.
17

119Id. at 1334 (Hunter, J., concurring).
20 Id. at 1337-38 (Hunter, J., concurring). Judge Hunter focused on the amount of official
involvement, contending that state action cannot be found through the state's mere acquiescence. Id.
121 Id. at 1335 (Hunter, J., concurring).
122 Id. at 1333-34 (Adams, J., concurring).
123 See id. at 1324-25, 27; supra notes 76-91 and accompanying text. A regulation of property
through, for example, zoning, may trigger two different due process claims. The first, procedural due process, is that the law deprived the owner of the use or possession of the property
without adequate procedural safeguards. The second, substantive due process, is that the law
deprived the owner of a reasonable return on the property. The substantive argument, if it
prevails, may either invalidate the statute or require the state to reimburse the owner. See, e.g..
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 122 (1978). See generally State v. New
Jersey Zinc Co., 40 N.J. 560, 193 A.2d 244 (1963); L. TRIBE, supra note 49, §§ 9-3, 9-4, at 45965.
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sus among clearly divided judges. It was unessential to reach a definite
conclusion if the statute were procedurally firm, 124 however, since
these issues will undoubtedly arise in subsequent litigation, more guidance would have been preferable.
By considering the constitutionality of lis pendens solely on procedural due process grounds, the appellate and district courts failed to
differentiate between the narrow and expansive situations in which Us
pendens has been used. 125 These two situations were outlined in
Scruggs, 126 in which the Chancery Division of the New Jersey Superior
Court separated the notice aspects from the substantive consequences
of the lis pendens statute.127 Scruggs demonstrates the typical use the
notice aspect provided by the filing of a lis pendens. During a mortgage foreclosure, the plaintiff filed a lis pendens concomitantly with
the complaint. The filing, the court noted, was nothing more than
notice that a previously established interest that had been voluntarily
created was being activated. 128 By not creating a new interest in the
real property and serving only as notice, the filing of a lis pendens did
not create the constitutional infirmities found by the district court
29
under the Mathews test.1
The use of lis pendens in the more expansive situation typically
involves a plaintiff's attempt to create an interest in the real estate
either by obtaining title or by seeking to impose a lien thereon. 30 This
newly created interest will be deemed superior to all subsequently
acquired interests in the property.' 3 ' The creation of this interest, as
the district court pointed out, invalidated the statute because it cre32
ated a priority "with insufficient [due] process."1

670 F.2d at 1331.
The district court acknowledged the two situations, nevertheless invalidated the statute.
519 F. Supp. at 1236. The court of appeals did not mention this distinction.
12 See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
127 Scruggs, 181 N.J. Super. at 56, 436 A.2d at 561.
128 Id. at 54, 436 A.2d at 563. For examples of lis pendens used validly, see Feld v. Kantrowitz,
99 N.J. Eq. 847, 137 A. 657 (1926) (suit for breach of contract in property sale); Dunning v.
Crane, 61 N.J. Eq. 634, 47 A. 420 (1900) (mortgagee who acquired lien subsequent to filing of
bill construing will); Finley v. Keene, 136 N.J. Eq. 347, 42 A.2d 208 (Ch. 1945) (suit to establish
trust on mortgaged property); Mabee v. Mabee, 85 N.J. Eq. 353, 96 A. 495 (Ch. 1916) (creditor
attached property during divorce settlement).
121 See 519 F. Supp. at 1262; see also Kukanskis v. Griffith, 180 Conn. 501,
430 A.2d 21
(1980).
130181 N.J. Super. at 56, 436 A.2d at 561; see also Polk v. Schwartz, 166 N.J. Super. 292, 399
A.2d 1001 (App. Div. 1974).
13 181 N.J. Super. at 56, 436 A.2d at 561.
132 519 F. Supp. at 1263. See generally Note, A Proposal for Reformation of the Iowa Lis
Pendens Statute, 67 IOWA L. REV. 289 (1982).
124
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It appears that the court of appeals decided that the statute was
constitutional without examining the critical situation resulting when
the filing of a lis pendens creates such an interest. A closer examination of Chrysler displays the inequities of expansively using the statute. Chrysler brought suit based on an allegedly fraudulent attempt
by Fedders to avoid payment on a promissory note. 133 The money
Chrysler demanded was allegedly then used by Fedders to discharge
liens on Fedders' property in Edison, New Jersey.13 4 Chrysler's proposed remedies included monetary damages and to facilitate their
135
recovery, the imposition of a constructive trust on the property.
Chrysler's filing of lis pendens appeared to be an attempt to secure the
property and effectuate the payment due under the promissory
note. 136 It can hardly be controverted that Chrysler was not concerned
with the Edison real estate but rather with its eventual ability to
recover a money judgment from a company that it believed to be
failing. 137
These facts illustrate a misuse of the lis pendens statute which the
New Jersey Legislature did not intend. 38 To secure its monetary
claim, Chrysler was able to encumber the Edison property and prevent Fedders from exercising its most beneficial use of the propertyits sale. 39 By filing the lis pendens, Chrysler gained an unfair advantage. Fedders, faced with the likelihood of long and drawn out
litigation, could be willing to settle the claim rather than lose the
opportunity to execute a profitable contract for a sale of the property. 140 Consequently, a plaintiff could use a lis pendens filing more as
a lever to induce settlement than as a vehicle for preventing a surreptitious disposition of property.41
These vicissitudes were overlooked by the Chrysler court. If the
court had recognized this problematic application of the statute and
"I See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
134 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
13 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
'3
519 F. Supp. at 1262.
13' Id. See generally Coral Isle West Ass'n v. Cindy Realty, Inc., 430 F. Supp. 396 (S.D. Fla.
1977) (lis pendens available only when relief specifically affects property involved).
131 The legislature intended only that the statute eradicate the injustices resulting from the
preadjudicatory alienation of the property. See, e.g., Wood v. Price, 79 N.J. Eq. 620, 81 A. 982
(1912); cf. CAL. CIv. CODE § 409.1 (West 1968) (amended 1980)(lIs pendens statute amended to
prevent misuse). See generally Note, supra note 23.
" 670 F.2d at 1322. It should be noted that the property, although encumbered, is still
alienable, however, as the district court pointed out, the lawsuit exceeds the value of the
property by $60,000,000. 519 F. Supp. at 1262.
40 See Note, supra note 29, at 80.
14' See supra note 138 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Lake Tulloch Corp. v. Dingman, No.
WE C-27140 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1973).
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tested it under the Mathews balancing standard, 42 it would have
declared the statute unconstitutional. The state's interest in maintaining its jurisdiction and power over the disputed real estate and the
defendant's interest in preventing an erroneous deprivation remain
the same in both the narrow and expansive lis pendens factual situations.143 In contrast, it is the plaintiff's interests balanced against the
state's interests and the defendant's interests that causes the expansive
use of lis pendens to fail the Mathews tripartite balancing test. 41 Even
if Fedders were liable for a breach of contract, Chrysler's interest is
still preserved because an enforceable judgment will allow Chrysler to
pursue any profit realized on the sale of the property. 45 Therefore,
there is little reason to keep the property encumbered when a plaintiff's only interest in the land is the property's relationship to preservation of a monetary claim. Although is pendens when used expansively
represents an unconstitutional "taking" of property under the due
process clause, it is necessary to examine whether the procedures of
the statute comport with procedural due process thereby affording
property owners a forum in which to litigate these claims. 46
The court of appeals outlined the statutory and nonstatutory
protections available to defendants and concluded that these protections afforded sufficient constitutional protection. 47 Excepting the
statutory section permitting a defendant to post security to discharge
the lis pendens, these provisions do not expeditiously help a defendant.
Posting of a security, though immediate, is unduly burdensome, 48
Furthermore, the lis pendens procedures offer a defendant little protection against the filing of meritless complaints, especially complaints
filed by pro se litigants not subject to court sanctions. "49
See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 24 & 28 and accompanying text.
141 See generally Biere v. Agway, 425 F. Supp. 654 (D. Vt. 1977) (pre-existing
interest in
property sufficient to constitutionally validate prejudgment attachment statute).
115See N.J. CT. R. 4:59 (judgment awards collectible through writ of execution); N.J. CT. R.
6:7-2 (judgment creditor permitted to discover debtor's assets to enforce judgment).
148 See Note, supra note 55, at 437-40.
14'
670 F.2d at 1320-21; see supra notes 107-17 and accompanying text. Further protections of
no immediate assistance to a defendant require the discharge of the lis pendens three years after
its filing, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-11 (West 1948) (amended 1960), and discharge after the
action has been settled. Id. § 2A: 15-17.
148 The posting of security section of the New Jersey lis pendens statute is found at N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A: 15-15 (West 1948) (amended 1960). The severe burden on a defendant is exemplified
by another action involving Fedders in which the company filed an $11,900,000 bond to lift a lis
pendens in Kentucky. See 670 F.2d at 1330.
14 The court of appeals did not consider this to be a weighty consideration. See 670 F.2d at
1329. The statute itself only requires the filing of a complaint. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 15-6 (West
1948) (amended 1960).
141
'43
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The nonstatutory protections delineated in Blanchard Management,150 provided that if a complaint does not arguably recite a cause
of action within the ambit of the lis pendens statute, the court may
grant a motion to discharge the notice of lis pendens, 15 1 or a motion
52
for summary judgment. 1
Although these procedures may give some property owners protection, they do not adequately shield a defendant like Fedders. Insofar as the plaintiff's complaint need only allege a minimal nexus
between his cause of action and the defendant's real property, the
53
motion to discharge a notice of lis pendens may easily be overcome. 1
Furthermore, the motion for summary judgment is not helpful in a
54
suit involving complex legal issues. 1
As Chrysler demonstrates, these protections currently available
to the defendant still do not protect him from erroneous deprivation.
Although the court of appeals maintained that it would be ineffective,
an expeditious postfiling hearing for probable cause is needed to prevent erroneous deprivation.' 55 Objections that the hearing would not
offer guidance on the merits in a complex factual situation are irrelevant, inasmuch as the hearing would determine only if the lis pendens
6
were properly used by the plaintiff. 15
One possible solution is requiring the defendant to request the
hearing after the filing of the lis pendens to determine if the plaintiff
has any specific interest in the property. After the parties have filed
affidavits 5 7 to narrow the issues, the judge conducts a hearing to
ascertain if the plaintiff was using the lis pendens expansively or
narrowly, 158 focusing on the plaintiff's interest in the real property,

1w See supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
151Blanchard Management, 170 N.J. Super. at 497-98, 406 A.2d at 1340.
152 Id.; accord Garfield v. Elmwood Stores, 17 N.J. Super. 513, 86 A.2d 308 (Ch. Div. 1952)
(defendants granted summary judgment when cause of action was not within statute); cf.
Grabowski v. S. & E. Constr. Co., 72 N.J. Super. 1, 177 A.2d 576 (Ch. Div. 1962) (lis pendens
not applicable in suits for money judgment).
15 670 F.2d at 1330 (citing 519 F. Supp. at 1263).
154 Id.
155 See Scruggs, 181 N.J. Super. at 60, 436 A.2d at 563-64 (proposing adoption of hearing
analogous to one required by New Jersey attachment and sequestration statutes); cI. CAL. CIv.
CODE § 409-1 (West 1968) (amended 1980) (expungement hearing required 20 days after filing).
116See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
17
Scruggs, 181 N.J. Super. at 60, 436 A.2d at 563-64; ci. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416
U.S. 600 (1974) (need for verified affidavit to obtain ex parte writ of sequestration).
'Si See supra notes 127 & 128 and accompanying text. Under this suggested procedure, a judge
could find that a plaintiff desiring to impose a constructive trust merely to protect a monetary
remedy as in Chrysler, may not be entitled to a fis pendens. This ruling will contradict
established New Jersey law granting a lis pendens upon filing a complaint for a constructive
trust. See Polk v. Schwartz, 166 N.J. Super. 292, 399 A.2d 1001 (App. Div. 1979).
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i.e. whether the plaintiff was mainly interested in obtaining money or
59
was truly concerned with recovery of the property.
If the judge determines that the lis pendens has been used narrowly, the motion to discharge the lis pendens should be denied. If he
determines, however, that the lis pendens has been used expansively,
then the judge must pursue a second level of analysis, balancing the
interests of the plaintiff with those of the defendant. The basic interests to be balanced are the degree of deprivation sustained by the
defendant and the risk to the plaintiff that the defendant will convey
the property to a bona fide purchaser. 6 ° The level of deprivation is
ascertained by analyzing the defendant's remaining uses of the real
estate, noting whether the lis pendens prevents the defendant from
completely using the property beneficially. Furthermore, the plaintiff
should have the burden of showing that it has been properly used.''
This model makes lis pendens less accessible and prevents a plaintiff who can demonstrate only a remote interest in the property from
maintaining an encumbrance thereby inducing an unfair settlement.
Although the narrow use of the current lis pendens statute is constitutionally sound, there is a need to establish procedures which will
62
protect a property owner when lis pendens is used expansively.

Michael C. Urciuoli

See supra notes 44 & 137 and accompanying text.
160State lis pendens statutes protect different plaintiff's interests. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE §
409.1 (West 1968) (amended 1980) (is pendens valid in suits to affect right of possession); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-6 (West 1948) (amended 1960) (lis pendens valid in suits to affect title).
I ' But see 519 F. Supp. at 1262 (in context of motion to dismiss or summary judgment,
burden of proof placed on defendant).
162 See, e.g., N.J.S. 918, 200th Leg.,
1st Sess. (1982); cf. The Growing Mis-use of Lis Pendens,
29 R.I.B.J. 3 (1981) (advocating change in law barring expansive use of lis pendens). But see
George v. Oakhurst Realty, Inc., 78 R.I. 212, 414 A.2d 471 (1980) (statute permitting one to file
lis pendens although filer has no legal or equitable interest in property held constitutional).
159

